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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
BY JAMES H. BOOSER*
Public utilities, which constitute a vital segment, of contemporary
economic activity, have been accorded pragmatic definition by a twentieth
century American pattern of state legislation circumscribed by constitutional
limitations.' The evolution of the public utility concept began in the seven
years from 1907 to 1913, when twenty-eight states, plus Hawaii and the
District of Columbia, went beyond the then prevailing pattern of railroad
commission regulation of certain transportation agencies, and vested in a
state commission (often an existing railroad commission, with or without
change of name) jurisdiction over additional business activities, such as
electric, gas, telephone and water companies, which were thereby subjected
to comprehensive regulation. 2 The constitutional limitations circumscribing
such legislative definition of the classes of business activities thus regulated
as public utilities are of continuing importance. In November 1962, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Sayre Land Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n,3 adopted the opinion of the superior court, delivered by Judge
Ervin, declaring that "the business of Land Company was not affected with
a public interest and could not be regulated as a public utility without violating
both the federal and state constitutions." 4 It is proposed, therefore, to review
the frequently significant, but infrequently litigated, scope of the public utility
concept in terms of public utility regulation's constitutional limitations. This
review will discuss applicable constitutional limitations, the purpose and scope
of the statutory grant (of which Pennsylvania's legislation is representative)
to a commission of jurisdiction over public utilities, and cases defining the
* A.B., 1931, Swarthmore College; LL.B., 1935, Harvard Law School; Member,
Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, and American Bar Associations; partner, McNees, Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
1. See Robinson, The Public Utility: A Problem in Social Engineering, 14 CORNELL
L.Q. 1 (1928) for a delightfully profound "airplane view" of the public utility field.
2. Such public utility commission legislation, initiated in 1907 in Wisconsin and in
New York by skillfully drafted statutes that set the pattern for most legislation of this
type throughout the nation, had by the end of 1913 been enacted in the following 30
jurisdictions, listed alphabetically with the year of initial enactment: Ariz. 1912, Cal.
1911, Colo. 1913, Conn. 1911, D.C. 1913, Ga. 1907, Hawaii 1913, Idaho 1913, Il.
1913, Ind. 1913, Kan. 1911, Me. 1913, Md. 1910, Mass. 1913, Mo. 1913, Mont. 1913, Nev.
1911, N.H. 1911, N.J. 1910 and 1911, N.Y. 1907, N.C. 1913, Ohio 1911, Okla. 1913, Ore.
1911, Pa. 1913, R.I. 1912, Vt. 1909, Wash. 1911, W. Va. 1913, and Wis. 1907. The representative Pennsylvania legislation of this type was the Public Service Company Law,
Pa. Laws 1913, Act 1374, replaced in 1937 by the Public Utility Law, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 66, §§ 1101-1535 (1959).
3. 409 Pa. 356, 185 A.2d 325, affirming 196 Pa. Super. 417, 175 A.2d 307 (1961).
4. Id. at 443, 175 A.2d at 320.
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permissible scope of such public utility regulation under applicable constitutional limitations.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS

The fundamental constitutional principles that must be met by any
valid legislative extension to a particular public utility of the comprehensive
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission are implicit in the
decisions sustaining Commission jurisdiction over conventional public utilities.
Generally speaking, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Law 5 grants to a Commission comprehensive jurisdiction over service and rates and certificates with respect to the conventional and monopolistic public utilities enumerated in the
Act. 6 One may assume the grant constitutional because the corresponding grant
of jurisdiction in the Public Service Company Law 7 (which the Public Utility
Law of 1937 replaced) had been held constitutional as a reasonable exercise of
police power by appropriate means for a legitimate end.8 For that regulatory
jurisdiction granted to the Commission, the legislature may reasonably establish
a separate classification limited to "necessary monopolies." Businesses affected
with a public interest because of a sanctioned monopoly for the service of a public
need may constitutionally be subjected to the Commission's power of regulation. 10
The controlling constitutional principles are the result of a number of
provisions found in the constitutions of Pennsylvania and of the United
States. Such is the effect, for example, of the fourteenth amendment to the
federal constitution, which prohibits deprivation or taking of property without due process of law. Such is the effect also of article I, section 9 (due
process clause) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as of article I,
section 1, which safeguards the inherent and indefeasible rights of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property. Article I, section 10 of the federal
constitution provides that private property may not be taken or applied
to public use without authority of law and without just compensation being
first made and secured. Article I, section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
likewise prohibits any law impairing the obligation of contracts, this prohibition
being subject, to an extent judicially defined, to necessary exercise of the
police power with respect to contracts that adversely affect the public health,
5.
6.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1101-1535 (1959).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1102(17) (1959).

7. Pa. Laws 1913, Act 1374.
8. Jenkins Twp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 65 Pa. Super. 122 (1916) ; Relief
Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co's. Petition, 63 Pa. Super. 1 (1916).
9. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 61 Pa. Super. 555,
566 (1915).
10. Hertz Drivurself v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948) ; Brink's Express
Co. v. Public Serv. Conm'n, 117 Pa. Super. 268, 178 Atl. 346 (1935).
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safety or welfare. Any legislative classification, too, must be reasonable, in
conformity with the prohibition of any special law regulating trade in article
III, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Here the federal constitution
by the fourteenth amendment guarantees equal protection of the laws. A state
statute repugnant to the state or federal constitution is void, and it is not
only the right but the duty of a court so to declare when the violation unequivocally appears." The exercise of the police power is subject to these
2
constitutional limitations through judicial review.'
These constitutional principles have given rise by way of specific application to the familiar test requiring that businesses must be affected with a
public interest sufficient to justify certain extreme regulations as an appropriate means to a legitimate end.' 3 This specific test, whether a business is
affected with a public interest, is the established test for determining the
validity of the intensive and extensive regulation of the public-utility type, and
has also been applied by the courts to related issues concerning price control.
The test is a shorthand expression for adjudicated circumstances justifying
such drastic regulation as an appropriate application of the police power. As
such the test is helpful and well established and avoids confusion. As carefully
14
explained by Chief Justice Jones in Hertz Drivurself v. Siggins,
The instances where a private property's "affection" with a
public interest does not rest upon its capacity for monopolistic use
in the performance of a service to the public in general so as to sub11. Hertz Drivurself v. Siggins, supra note 10.
12. Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67

(1940);

Carpenter,

Substantive Due Process at Issue: A Resume, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 47, 50-52, 60-66, 68-74

(1958). Mr. Justice Roberts said in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 525
(1934) :
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general
rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm ....
The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth,
as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public
welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing
that . . . the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to
be attained.
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-415 (1922).
13. [A] law which purports to be an exercise of the police power must not be
unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case,
and the means which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to
the objects sought to be attained. Under the guise of protecting the public interests the legislature may not arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 551, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (1954); Warren v.
Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 362, 365, 127 A.2d 703, 705 (1956).
14. Supra note 10, at 37, 58 A.2d at 471.
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ject the property to legislative regulation and control are relatively
few indeed. The fact of the matter is that confusion seems to have
been unnecessarily injected into the concept of public regulation of
private property by treating all such regulations as constituting similar exertions of power.
Obviously, a different basis of justification for exercise of the police power
must be found for sweeping public-utility regulation than for lesser types of
regulation of various businesses involving differing circumstances. In Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of IndustrialRelations,1" Mr. Chief Justice Taft stated:
All business is subject to some kinds of public regulation, but
when the public becomes so dependent upon a particular business that
one engaging therein subjects himself to a more intimate public regulation is only to be determined by the process of exclusion and inclusion ....
To say that a business is clothed with a public interest is not to
determine what regulation may be permissible in view of the private
rights of the owner. The extent to which an inn . . . may be regu-

lated may differ widely from that allowable as to a railroad or other
common carrier. .

.

. It depends upon the nature of the business, on

the feature which touches the public, and on the abuses reasonably
to be feared ....

The extent to which regulation may reasonably go

varies with different kinds of business.16

In light of the foregoing constitutional limitations it is next necessary to examine the purpose and scope of commission jurisdiction over public utilities.
While the analysis will focus upon Pennsylvania legislation, it may be applied
readily to similar public utility legislation in many states.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STATUTORY GRANT TO
COMMISSION OF JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC UTILITIES

Certain enumerated classes of public services are subjected by the Public
Utility Law to commission-administered comprehensive regulation integrated
about an affirmative duty to serve the public at reasonable rates under a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The statutory grant to the Commission of jurisdiction over public utilities is couched in terms of (1) some
definitions of the businesses being regulated as public utilities, plus (2)
sweeping provisions for the regulation by the Commission of such public
utilities. The definitions and the regulations together identify the fundamental
underlying purpose of the jurisdiction granted to the Commission by the
Public Utility Law. That fundamental purpose, self-evident from the evil to
be feared with respect to the businesses listed as public utilities and from the
15. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
16. Id. at 538-39.
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evil for which the regulations set forth were appropriate remedies, was the
control of necessary monopolies. 17 It is well established that Commission jurisdiction over utilities enumerated in the Public Utility Law, like Commission
jurisdiction over service companies enumerated in the former Public Service
Company Law, is designed to secure fair treatment of the public through adequate service at reasonable rates.' 8
Definitions of Public Utilities Regulated as Necessary Monopolies
The Public Utility Law defines the term "public utility" by enumeration' 9
of "seven named general classes of public service."'20 These classes of public
service subject to comprehensive Commission jurisdiction may be briefly
identified 2' according to their grouping in that statute as: (a) light, heat and
power; (b) water; (c) common carrier; (d) canal, turnpike, tunnel, bridge
and wharf; (e) pipe line; (f) telephone and telegraph; and (g) sewage. In
each case the service must be furnished to or for the public, an express statutory limitation declaratory of constitutional limitations applicable in any
event.

22

The derivation and history of this pattern of definition of public utilities
by listing of public services further illuminates the purpose and the constitu17. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1877) ; Hertz Drivurself v. Siggins, supra
note 10; Coplay Cement Mfg. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 Pa. 58, 62, 114 Atl. 649,
650 (1921) ; Perry County Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 265 Pa. 274, 108
AtI. 659 (1919) ; Relief Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co's. Petition, supra note 8.
18. Northern Pennsylvania Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 333 Pa.
265, 5 A.2d 133 (1939); Brink's Express Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 117 Pa. Super.
268, 178 Atl. 346 (1935).
19. Public utilities
subject to Commission jurisdiction and regulation are classified
and enumerated as follows:
(17) "Public Utility" means persons or corporations now or hereafter owning
or operating inthis Commonwealth equipment,or facilities
for:
(a) Producing, generating, transmitting, distributing or furnishing natural or
artificial gas, electricity, or steam for the production of light, heat or power to
or for the public for compensation:
(b) Diverting, developing, pumping, impounding, distributing, or furnishing water
to or for the public for compensation;
(c) Transporting passengers or property as a common carrier;
(d) Use as a canal, turnpike, tunnel, bridge, wharf, and the like for the public for
compensation;
(e) Transporting or conveying natural or artificial gas, crude oil, gasoline, or
petroleum products, materials for refrigeration, or other fluid substance, by pipe
line or conduit, for the public for compensation;
(f) Conveying or transmitting messages or communications by telephone or telegraph for the public for compensation;
(g) Sewage collection, treatment, or disposal for the public for compensation.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1102(17) (1959).
20. Philadelphia Ass'n of Wholesale Opticians v. Public Util. Comm'n, 152 Pa.
Super. 89, 91, 30 A.2d 712, 714 (1943).
21. See also CASPER, PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY LAW AND PROCEDURE 1-17
(1943).
22. State ex reL. M. 0. Danciger & Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Mo. 483, 494,
205 S.W. 36, 40 (1918).
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tional boundaries of the regulatory jurisdiction granted the Commission. The
above-quoted portion of the Public Utility Law was derived, almost verbatim,
23
from the carefully drafted provisions of the Uniform Public Utilities Act.
The Public Utility Law, like the Uniform Public Utilities Act and the Public
Service Company Law, followed in fundamental respects the pattern of the
pioneer 1907 legislation of this type in Wisconsin and New York, which had
served as the inspiration and model for the rapid succession of such public
service commission or public utility commission statutes which swept America
in the ensuing decade, and which by 1913 had been enacted in thirty jurisdictions. This legislation took the administrative method of regulation by an
expert commission with continuing, state-wide jurisdiction, as previously
worked out for railroads. Such commission jurisdiction was extended to public
services theretofore recognized by the courts as requiring, for the protection
of their patrons against monopolistic oppression, appropriate regulation and a
judicially enforced duty to serve the public at reasonable rates. This pragmatic
approach, wary of constitutional pitfalls, was approved by the Supreme Court
of the United States, as illustrated in 1914, when such commission regulation
had become the order of the day, by the classic statement in German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Lewis :24

We can best explain by examples. The transportation of propertybusiness of common carriers-is obviously of public concern, and its
regulation is an accepted governmental power. The transmission of
intelligence is of cognate character. There are other utilities which are
denominated public, such as the furnishing of water and light, including in the latter gas and electricity. We do not hesitate at their
regulation nor at the fixing of the prices which may be charged for
their services. The basis of the ready concession of the power of
regulation is the public interest.
23. Uniform Public Utilities Act 1 (d) reads as follows:
The term "public utility," when used in this act, includes persons and corporations, or their lessees, trustees and receivers now or hereafter owning or operating
in this state equipment or facilities for :
(1) Producing, generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing gas, electricity, steam or any other agency for the production of light, heat or power to
or for the public for compensation;
(2) Diverting, developing, pumping, impounding, distributing, or furnishing
water to or for the public for compensation;
(3)
Transporting persons or property by street, suburban or interurban
railways for the public for compensation;
(4)
Transporting persons or property by motor vehicles for the public for
compensation [but not including taxicab or truck service in cities or towns].
(5) Transporting or conveying gas, crude oil or other fluid substance by
pipe line for the public for compensation;
(6)
Conveying or transmitting messages or communications by telephone
or telegraph, where such service is offered to the public for compensation. . ..
See Report of Committee on a Uniform Public Utilities Act, in THE ANNUAL CON-FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 721, 737-68 (1927).
24. 233 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1914).
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Commission legislation under the police power was built upon the solid rock
of prior judicial determinations 25 of the conditions of necessary monopoly
under which an affirmative duty to serve the public could justifiably be
26
imposed.
Comprehensive Regulations Appropriate to Necessary Monopolies
Examination of the regulations enacted in the Public Utility Law discloses that the Commission's jurisdiction goes very far. First and foremost,
the Commission has jurisdiction to impose an affirmative duty to serve the
public. 27 The Commission also has jurisdiction to require, with respect to
service to the public, that such service, and the facilities incidental thereto, be
adequate. 28 Furthermore, the Commission has jurisdiction to define reasonable charges, thus delimiting and supporting the affirmative duty to furnish
the public adequate service. 29 In addition, the Commission has jurisdiction to
prevent discrimination, thus further insuring the availability to every member
of the public of adequate service.3 0 Moreover, the Public Utility Law subjects
"any proposed public utility" and any "public utility" to the Commission's
jurisdiction to control the entry into such business, the extent of competition,
and extensions of service, through the granting of certificates of public convenience where found necessary for the service of the public. 31 Then too, in
view of public dependence, the Commission has jurisdiction to require continuance of service, and its approval is made a prerequisite to abandoning and
forsaking the service.3 2 These five definitive elements of the Commission's
jurisdiction over service and rates are buttressed by related jurisdiction with
respect to every "public utility" to require filing of tariffs and adherence
thereto,3 3 valuation of property,3 4 reasonable standards of service and facilities,3 5 filing of copies of contracts in relation to its public service, 36 public
25. Those judicial decisions are collected, and catalogued as to the various types
of basic monopoly, natural, virtual and legal, and their several subdivisions in WYMAN,
THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS

§§ 92, 111, 113, 124, 133,

136 (1911).
26. As observed concerning an Illinois public utilities act in State Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 267 Ill. 528, 543, 108 N.E. 716, 721 (1915) ; "The
act . . . designates . . . classes of public utilities . . . subject to its provisions. .

Act does not create, but only regulates, existing public utilities."
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1959).
28. Ibid.
29. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1141 (1959).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1144, 1172 (1959): "No public utility shall ...
any unreasonable preference."
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1121-23 (1959).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1122 (1959).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1142-43 (1959).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1151 (1959).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1182 (1959).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1184 (1959).

.
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letting of contracts, 7 mandatory systems of accounts,88 continuing records of
property used or useful in the public service,3 9 depreciation accounts and re41
ports, 40 registration of securities or obligations to be issued or assumed,
42
filing of contracts with affiliated interests for services to any public utility,
44
reports, 43 and compliance with regulations and orders of the Commission.
The Commission has jurisdiction, too, over any public utility with respect to
acquisitions or transfers of property, including consolidations, mergers, sales
or leases. 45 Also among the many ramifications of its jurisdiction over every
public utility, the Commission may revise any contracts entered into by any
public utility which are "affected ... with the public interest." 46
The Commission's jurisdiction is operative as an entirety. With respect
to each of the many elements of its jurisdiction, any public utility subject to
one such regulation is ipso facto subject to the entire body of regulations making up the Commission's jurisdiction. 47 Interrelationships of various elements
of regulatory jurisdiction are reflected in this pattern of Commission jurisdiction. This pattern is characteristic of most modern legislation providing for
commission jurisdiction over public utilities. The Commission cannot have
jurisdiction to regulate maximum rates unless it has jurisdiction to impose a
duty to serve the public, and it cannot fairly or efficiently impose a duty to
serve the public unless it has jurisdiction to regulate competition by certificates
based upon public convenience and necessity.
The public interest is the sole justification with respect to any business
subjected to the jurisdiction of the Commission. That is apparent from the
foregoing examination of the statutory definitions of the public utilities regulated as necessary monopolies, and of the comprehensive statutory regulation
of businesses furnishing to a dependent public the classes of services enumerated in this legislation. The Public Utility Law makes no findings as the basis
for subjecting public utilities to the Commission's jurisdiction; the law makes
a declaration of policy and findings only when it goes beyond public utilities
to regulate (to a lesser extent found appropriate) contract carriers by motor
vehicle and brokers. 48 Directed to no emergency, this is permanent legislation,
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1187 (1959).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1211 (1959).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1212 (1959).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1213 (1959).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1241 (1959).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1271 (1959).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1345 (1959).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1347 (1959).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 66, § 1122 (1959).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1360 (1959).
47. State ex rel. M. 0. Danciger Co. v. Public Serv.

Comm'n, supra note 22;

Barnes Laundry Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 266 Pa. 24, 109 Atl. 535 (1920).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1301 (1959).
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in effect since 1937, when it replaced the Public Service Company Law which
had been in effect since 1914.
CASES DEFINING PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF COMMISSION JURISDICTION

UNDER APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Pertinent cases disclose the boundaries of the permissible constitutional
scope of the Commission's comprehensive jurisdiction over public utilities.
These cases relate to the three salient elements of the Commission's jurisdiction: (1) an affirmative duty to serve the public, (2) at reasonable rates, (3)
under a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
Affirmative Duty to Serve the Public
Since an ordinary business may refuse to contract or deal with any who
would patronize it, only a small special group of businesses voluntarily devoted to appropriate public services and affected with a sufficient public interest can be placed under an affirmative duty to serve the public; the police
power cannot be pushed further. 4 "Unless the entrepreneur himself elects
to sell 'publicly' he cannot be made to do so."0 So in City of St. Paul v.
Tri-State Tel. Co.,51 holding that a commission had no jurisdiction to compel
a telephone company to furnish wires and conduits required by a city for its
fire alarm system, the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated: "It is quite obvious
that the facilities sought in the city's petition are no part of the public telephone system which the company holds itself out as ready to furnish the public ....

[I]t is beyond the legislative power to compel it. .

.

. [T]he service

sought cannot be compelled by the commission but must be left to voluntary
52
contract."
"It is a further requisite [before a business may be placed under the duty
49. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1925); Producer's Transp. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920) ; Terminal Taxicab
Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 256 (1916) ; Weems Steamboat Co. v. People's Steamboat
Co., 214 U.S. 345, 356 (1908) ; Hertz Drivurself v. Siggins, supra note 10; Dairymen's
Co-op. Sales Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 115 Pa. Super. 100, 174 At. 826 (1934),
aff'd on lower court opinion, 318 Pa. 381, 177 Atl. 770 (1935) ; Overlook Dev. Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 101 Pa. Super. 217 (1930), aff'd on lower court opinion, 306 Pa.
43, 158 Atl. 869 (1932).
50. Robinson, The Public Utility: A Problem in Social Engineering, 14 CORNELL
L.Q. 1, 11 n.23 (1928). In Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 173 Cal. 577, 585,
160 Pac. 828, 831 (1916), it was held to be an unconstitutional taking of property when
a commission ordered a railroad to extend its lines beyond the scope of that carrier's
commitment to the public service. That decision is representative of the uniform rulings
according constitutional protection to a utility against being subjected, beyond the area
to which the utility devoted its service, to an affirmative duty to serve the public.
51. 193 Minn. 484, 258 N.W. 822 (1935).
52. Id. at 485-87, 258 N.W. at 822, 823-24. 1 WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS § 200 (1911) states:
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to serve] that the business be so affected with a public interest as to make
the regulation necessary for the common good."'5 3 The permissible constitutional scope of all statutory extensions, beyond the historic common callings,
of the exceptional duty is governed by the principle declared by Chief Justice
Waite in the landmark case of Munn v. Illinois. 54 The principle upon which
"this power of regulation" rests, by which "we may determine what is within
and what without its operative effect" 5 5 was determined in the Munn case by
reading the prohibitory language of the fourteenth amendment (no state shall
"deprive any persons of . . . property, without due process of law") in the
light of the "common law, from whence came the right which the Constitution
protects" and thus finding as an "essential element in the law of property"
that (in the language of Lord Hale and Chief Justice Waite) "when private
property 'is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only.' "56
It should be remembered, in justification of the imposition of the extraordinary law which requires those who are engaged in public callings to serve all
that apply, that the service is voluntarily assumed. Even one who has acquired
a virtual monopoly is not forced into public service against his will; it is only
when he has held himself out in some way as ready to serve that he is bound
thereafter to deal with all indiscriminately.
But as set forth in Stoehr v. Natatorium Co., 34 Idaho 217, 221-22, 200 Pac. 132, 133
(1921), "If the service is dedicated to the public . . . the public . . . is entitled to the
service of the utility as a matter of right . .. ."
53. BLANNING, REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 3 (1924).
54. Supra note 17, at 126-32.
55. Id. at 125.
56. Id. at 126. In thus construing in the light of the common law the "property"
of which the state could "deprive" no person, Chief Justice Waite was building in a
common sense way upon very pertinent common law precedents involving comparable
issues and establishing that certain exceptional businesses were appropriate subjects upon
which to impose an affirmative duty to serve enforced by the courts.
The common law developed through declaratory fourteenth century legislation, incident to the Black Death, from still earlier feudal custom and status in England dom-

inated by the concept of relation:
197, 215 (1957) ; 2 HOLDSWORTH,

GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN

THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW

CAPITALISM

383, 384 (1909) ; POUND,
29 (1921). Then the "duty to serve was the essence

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

of the regulations of the time," and the common law continued its recognition of such
duty to serve as to any business affected by likelihood of oppression and monopolistic
tendencies: Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV.
411, 423-24, 428 (1927).
The affirmative duty to serve the public has long had its most conspicuous application to the common carrier, "a public utility by ancient usage and understanding."
Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252 (1916); Sandford v. Railroad Co., 24
Pa. 378 (1855) ; Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683); 2
BACON, ABRIDGEMENT 343-44 (1736).
This obligation to serve all was felt necessary at common law also as to callings
and businesses intimately associated with common carriage. The common ferryman
remained a sort of common carrier: 2 BACON, op. cit. supra at 344 (1736) : "an action
will lie against a common Ferry-man, who refuses to carry"; Lord Hale, De Jure Maris,
1 HARGRAVE, LAW TRACTS 6 (1787) ; see Smith v. Seward, 3 Pa. 342, 345 (1846). The
public wharfinger receiving goods in transit was under similar obligations: Bolt v.
Stennett, 8 T.R. 607, 608, 101 Eng. Rep. 1572, 1573 (K.B. 1800): "Lord Hale consid-
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That "principle which supports the legislation we are now examining" 5
Chief Justice Waite found, historically, in the source of regulation of ferrymen, wharfingers, warehousemen and common carriers"8 prior to the theri
recent adoption of the fourteenth amendment. This principle was an essential
element in the decision in the Munn case because it was from this power to,
require that the public be served that the Supreme Court implied the power
to establish maximum rates for the purpose of making effective that underlying
duty to serve the public. 59 This duty to serve the public, which Munn had voluntarily assumed and was not in a position to question, was the basis upon
which "the right to establish the maximum of charge" was implied from the
power to regulate because "without it the owner could make his rates at will
and compel the public to yield to his terms, or forego the use." 60
A business under an appropriate duty to serve the public, thus affected
with a public interest in the constitutional sense, was characteristically a common carrier or the proprietor of a closely related business such as that of a
grain elevator. Munn v. Illinois involved a grain elevator whose virtual monopoly emphasized its transportation functions in the very gateway of the
largest traffic between the Northwest and the Atlantic coast. 6 1 The vast imered a public quay to be . . . common to all." Lord Hale, De Partibus Maris, I HARGRAVE, op. cit. supra at 77-78: "If the . .. subject have a publick wharf . . . the wharf
• • • and other conveniences are affected with publick interest"; see Rodgers v. Stophel,
32 Pa. 111, 113-14 (1858). Under the same precedents and principle, that duty to serve
the public extended to bonded warehouses of London Dock Company: Allnut v. Inglis,
12 East 527, 537, 540, 104 Eng. Rep. 206, 210-11 (K.B. 1810).
57. Munn v. Illinois, supra note 17, at 129.
58. Id. at 126-30.
59. The duty to serve the public, imposed upon common carriers-as a most conspicuous instance-at common law, had been imposed upon the grain elevator involved
in Munn v. Illinois by Ill. Laws, 1871-72 § 6, at 763: "It shall be the duty of every
warehouseman of Class A to receive for storage any grain that may be tendered to him
in the usual manner .... ." That legislation followed the declaration in article XIII,
section 1 of the Illinois Constitution itself that grain elevators were "public warehouses."
60. Munn v. Illinois, supra note 17, at 134.
61. Chief Justice Waite accepted as true the following facts:
[T]he largest traffic between the citizens of the country north and west of
Chicago and the citizens of the country lying on the Atlantic coast north of
Washington is in grain which passes through the elevators of Chicago .... They
are located with the river harbor on one side and the railway tracks on the
other; and the grain is run through them from car to vessel .... The railways

have found it impracticable to own such elevators, and public policy forbids the
transaction of such business by the carrier .... In this Chicago gateway of a vast

commerce the grain storage prices were fixed annually by agreement of the
"fourteen warehouses adapted to this particular business .... [I]t is apparent
that all the elevating facilities . .. may be a "virtual" monopoly.

Hence from "the facts" and relevant provisions of the Illinois Constitution, Chief Justice
Waite saw "very clearly" that "remedies such as are usually employed to prevent abuses
by virtual monopolies might not be inappropriate here."
Chief Justice Waite therefore concluded that "if any business can be clothed 'with
a public interest, and cease to be juris privati only,' this has been. It may not be made
so by the operation of the Constitution of Illinois or this statute, but it is by the facts.'Id. at 130-32.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

portance of Munn v. Illinois arose from its selection by the Supreme Court as
the most appropriate of the several cases, held under advisement for more than
a year and simultaneously decided, in which to give its opinion on the fundamental principle determining the momentous matter of the constitutionality
'of legislative regulation of railroads. Together with, and on the basis of, Munn
v. Illinois, the Supreme Court decided Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Iowa,62 Peik
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,6 8 and the other companion cases commonly known
as the Granger cases. The historical principles recognizing as "affected with
a public interest" businesses engaged in a public employment and under a
64
duty to serve the public were found decisive.
The constitutional scope for imposing an affirmative duty to serve the
public, as declared in Munn v. Illinois, has remained unchanged. While today
not all businesses affected with a public interest are public utilities, all public
utilities must still be businesses affected with a public interest. In other words,
the concept of a business affected with a public interest is broader than the
concept of a public utility and has been extended to cases where on other
grounds justifying such lesser regulation it has been held a proper exercise
of the police power to regulate maximum rates otherwise fixed by concert
rather than by competition, 65 or minimum rates found necessary to avoid the
destructive effects of too much competition.66 It is still the law, however, that
a business must be affected with a public interest to be declared a public
utility. 6 T Or as the Supreme Court said in Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles,"

that the business "possesses the basic indicia of a public utility .... 69
62. 94 U.S. 155 (1877).

63. 94 U.S. 164 (1877).
64. Again in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., v. Iowa, supra note 62, at 161, Chief Justice
Waite treated that principle, recognized in the Munn case, as controlling, saying, "Railroad companies are carriers for hire .... They are, therefore, engaged in a public employment ...

and, under the decision in Munn ... subject to legislative control as to their

rates ...."
65. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
66. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531 (1934): "[Blusiness bound . . .to
serve all who apply ...

is commonly called a public utility .... [Djairy industry is not,

in the accepted sense of the phrase, a public utility."
67. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 148 (1944), reversing Davies
Warehouse Co. v. Brown, 137 F.2d 201 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943), where a monumental
dissenting opinion to the same effect had been delivered by Chief Judge Vinson (later
Chief Justice of the United States), id. at 209-27.
68. Supra note 67, at 148.
69. Chief Judge Vinson found from an exhaustive review of the decisions that a
public utility is defined by its bundle of fundamental characteristics as "a business affected
with a public interest," participating in activities "intimately connected with the processes
of transportation and distribution," under an "obligation to serve the public upon demand
at reasonable and non-discriminatory rates" and "so constituted as to enjoy comparative
freedom from . . . competition." Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, supra note 67, at

213-16.
In holding that "petitioner's public warehouse under the circumstances is a public
utility within the exemption of the Price Control Act" the Supreme Court found that
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Any attempt to impose upon a private business that duty to serve the
public characteristic of a public utility "would be in derogation of due process." 70 In recognition of the restraints on the national government imposed
by the fifth amendment, similar to those imposed on the states by the fourteenth
amendment, courts took care to point out that the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, as an exercise of the war power, refrained from imposing an
unconstitutional affirmative duty to sell or to lease. In upholding the constitutionality of maximum rent orders under that emergency federal legislation,
the Supreme Court pointed out in Bowles v. Willingham71 that "We are not
dealing here with a situation which involves a 'taking' of property ....

There

is no requirement that the apartments in question be used for purposes which
bring them under the Act."7 2 On the other hand, an affirmative duty to serve
73
the public is the trade mark of a public utility.

"Congress did not intend . . . to supersede the power of a state regulatory commission,
exercising comprehensive control over the prices of a business appropriately classified
as a utility. Classification by California of the public warehouse business as a utility is
not novel, surprising or capricious." The Supreme Court recognized the weight of the
objection that in considering the status of an industry as a public utility under state
law "the Administrator 'would have to face the question whether the particular business
concerned was sufficiently "affected with a public interest" constitutionally to justify the
type of legal obligation which the state imposes'" but answered that "We think the
Administrator will not be remiss in his duties if he assumes the constitutionality of state
regulatory statutes, under both State and Federal Constitutions, in the absence of a
contrary judicial determination." Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, supra note 67, at
152-53.
70. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, supra note 67, at 223.
71. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
72. Id. at 517. In the case thus approved be the Supreme Court of Wilson v.
Brown, 137 F.2d 348, 351-52 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943), Judge Magruder (in the same court
which decided Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, supra note 67) had spelled out the
limitations of the fifth amendment with which such emergency wartime rent control
complied as follows:
In the case of public utilities there is an extensive and permanent regulation of
the use of the properties . . . of which the regulation of rates is only a part.
The situation more nearly approaches a "taking" of the properties, or the use
thereof, than in the case of war-time rent regulation. As the Administrator
rightly points out, the Emergency Price Control Act is concerned with the regulation of prices and rents which are normally determined by the operation of
economic forces in a free competitive market; it is not designed "as a permanent
substitute for the normal operation of competitive forces, but as a bridge over a
period of emergency when the normal influences of the market place are temporarily distorted by war conditions." The useful life of housing accommodations
extends far beyond the contemplated period of rent control. There is, in fact, no
appropriation of the housing accommodations at all, and so far as there is a
narrow restriction on their use, it is for a very limited period. A limit in time,
to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld as
a permanent change. . . . Furthermore, the Act does not require the landlord
to continue his property in the market for housing accommodations. . . . The
landlord is thus free to occupy the property himself, or devote it to some commercial enterprise, or utilize it in any other way. This serves to emphasize that
there has been no "taking" of his property in the constitutional sense.
Wilson v. Brown, supra at 351-52.
73. See Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n,
356 U.S. 282, 286 (1958) ; 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities § 7 (1951).
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Duty and Right to Charge Reasonable Rates
The public utility has a correlative duty and right to charge reasonable
rates.7 4 Without competition to protect the public interest, the regulation of
the rates of common carriers and other necessary monopolies subjected to the
Commission's jurisdiction over public utilities is justified. Such rate regulation
is necessary both to make effective the duty to serve and to prevent extortion.
This was apparent on a grand scale in Munn v. Illinois.75 There the fixing of
rates, not by competition, but by concert, on the part of fourteen grain elevators in Chicago was deemed to amount to a virtual monopoly. Again the need
of close connection with railroad transportation for immediate service and the
danger of extortion similarly justified regulation of rates of the two or three
small public-grain elevators at the Grand Harbor Station of the Great Northern Railroad. The elevator owners (who were in limited competition but who
could not in combination begin to handle all the local business with their limited facilities) were not in competition as to rates for public storage of grain
(grain that they also were in the business of buying) ; and members of the
public engaged in the state's chief industry, grain, were even more dependent
upon these elevators, though on a smaller, local scale.7 6
74. Munn v. Illinois, supra note 17; GLAESER, op. cit. supra note 56; see also Solar
Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. 325, 9 A.2d 447 (1939).

75. Supra note 17.
76. Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 (1894), affirming State ex rel. Stoeser
v. Brass, 2 N.D. 482, 52 N.W. 408 (1892). In the former case, Mr. Justice Shiras for the
majority followed Munn v. Illinois and ruled:
[I]t is competent for the legislative power to control the business of elevating
[I]t follows that such power may
and storing grain ... in cities of one size ....
be legally exercised over the same business when carried on in smaller cities, and
[w]e would not be justified in imputing an improper
in other circumstances ....
exercise of discretion to the legislature of North Dakota.
As Mr. Justice Shiras further construed the duty to serve (misapprehended by the dissent) under the North Dakota statute, "We do not understand this law to require the
owner of a warehouse, built and used by him only to store his own grain, to receive
and store the grain of others." Brass v. North Dakota, supra at 404-05. Mr. Justice
Brewer in dissenting sought to say, in his effort to limit what he deemed the unsound
decision in Munn v. Illinois, that since there were hundreds of grain elevators in North
Dakota, therefore, there was here no practical monopoly to which the citizen was compelled to resort. But the majority did not agree with him: cf. Hertz Drivurself v.
Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota had found that "this case falls clearly within
the reasoning of" Munn v. Illinois on the basis of the following facts subject to judicial
notice:
The appellant's grain elevator may be taken as fairly representative of the "six
hundred grain elevators, flathouses, and warehouses" which it appears by the
answer exist in North Dakota. It stands at a railroad station, adjoining the track,
Its uses . . . are
which track leads to a market within and without the state....
closely connected with the principal productive industry of this state, viz., that
of grain-raising for shipment to market. . . . Usually the proprietor of the elevator is himself a buyer of grain as well as a warehouseman, and the station
where the elevator is located is practically the only place in the vicinity, or for
miles around, where the producer can find either storage or a buyer for his
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Except for public utilities and a few other businesses sufficiently affected
with a public interest, the legislature has no power to fix maximum prices. 7
A Montana statute creating a state trade commission, with power to regulate
prices and profits, including those in ordinary mercantile business, was held
unconstitutional and void in A. M. Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyle,7 8 Judge
Bourquin stating that:
[I]n every case the justices were unanimous that price regulation in
ordinary mercantile business is void .

. .

. American Constitutions

distributed, balanced and checked power. ... From their inception it
has been ...

accepted doctrine that by state Constitutions the people

reserved to themselves the power to regulate prices in ordinary business and employment, and that by the Fourteenth Amendment, they
suspended the power so long as the "due process" clause endures.
Their circumstances, conditions, character, disposition, ideals, and
the times prompted them to accept the principle of free and unrestricted bargaining.
This construction of Constitutions is virtually a rule of property
and a principle of government, not to be changed by Legislatures or
courts in any circumstances, but only by the people by constitutional
79
amendment.
In a few exceptional cases going beyond the field of businesses under a duty
to serve the public, price fixing has been found justified because of the inadequacy of competition to safeguard vital public interests. In the leading case
of German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,s0 the doctrine concerning rate regulation
of businesses affected with a public interest was expanded to express the
analogous justification for fixing, under the police power, maximum rates for
fire insurance, otherwise fixed by concert rather than by competition. While
the insurers competed for the business, they all fixed their premiums for similar risks according to an agreed schedule of rates. A similar result was reached
with respect to "an indispensable service" where stockyard market agencies
had eliminated rate competition and had substituted rates fixed by agreegrain. It is conceived to be important to the seller that this grain should be in
hand, and accessible at the railroad station, where it can be disposed of on any
day when the market is favorable or when necessity compels a sale. . . . Nor is
shipping by carload lots so convenient to small producers, who more frequently
than otherwise would be unable to hold a box car at a station long enough to
enable them to haul their grain from a distance and fill such car. . . . In brief,
the elevator and warehouses are indispensable auxiliaries of the producers in
conveying their grain to market . . . the business carried on at the warehouses
and elevators erected at the railroad stations in North Dakota has a relation
to the entire public which is unique. Such warehousemen, like common carriers
exercised a calling or business "public in its character .
State ex rel. Stoeser, supra at 504-06, 52 N.W. at 416-17.
77. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U.S. 238, 247 (1902).
78. 263 Fed. 134 (D. Mont. 1920).
79. Id. at 136-37.
80. Supra note 65.
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ment. 8s To protect the necessary monopolies of public carriers, the fixing of
minimum rates was thereafter found justified as an exercise of the police
power in the case of competing contract carriers.8 2 Where competition was
excessive and destructive, the fixing of a minimum retail price of milk (nine
cents per quart) was upheld in Nebbia v. New York. s3 So different, however,
are the justifications for such minimum rates and prices that their constitutionality is best viewed in terms of the specific facts tested by general police
power principles.
While the rates of public utilities may be regulated, rate regulation alone
does not constitute a business, "in the accepted sense of the phrase, a public
utility. ' 8 4 Regulation of rental rates, for example, is narrowly limited by the
state and federal constitutions. Rent control which impinges upon the constitutional rights of the owners of property must be based upon a public
exigency or emergency temporarily justifying an exercise of the police power
going to "the verge of the law."'8' In the absence of a public exigency, "The
renting of a property ... is a private business ....86
Certificatesof Public Convenience and Necessity
The boundaries of the permissible constitutional scope of jurisdiction over
public utilities are further marked by cases concerning certificates of public
convenience and necessity. It is well settled that the prerequisite of a certificate
to enter a business, by which means competition is controlled, can be imposed
only upon businesses with an appropriate public interest.8 T The requirement
81. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 438, 439 (1930).
82. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 273-75 (1932) ; see also Nebbia v. New
York, supra note 66, at 536.
While the Commission does constitutionally regulate the minimum rates of contract
carriers, there the Commission acts under carefully tailored specific statutory authority
over contract carriers as such and not by virtue of its jurisdiction over public utilities.
83. Id. at 538: "the conditions . . . make unrestricted competition an inadequate
safeguard of the consumer's interest .
84. Id. at 531.
85. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Chestleton Corp.
v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 549 (1924) : "upon the facts that we judicially know . . . the
law has ceased to operate"; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921) ; District of
Columbia v. McKee, 24 F.2d 894, 895 (D.C. 1928) ; Peck v. Fink, 2 F.2d 912, 913 (Cir.
1924).
86. Hirsh v. Black, 267 Fed. 614, 620 (D.C. 1920), rev'd, Block v. Hirsh, supra note
85. The Supreme Court failed to find the necessary exigency.
Unless a business is affected with a public interest sufficient to justify imposing upon
it a duty to serve the public, there is in the Public Utility Law no expression of any
legislative intention that the Commission shall have any jurisdiction over it as a public
utility to regulate its maximum rates.
87. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) ; General Alarm, Inc. v.
Underdown, 76 Ariz. 235, 262 P.2d 671 (1953) ; Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, 217 Ore. 205, 341
P.2d 1063 (1959) ; Hertz Drivurself v. Siggins, supra note 76; Relief Elec., Light, Heat
and Power Co.'s Petition, 63 Pa. Super. 1 (1916). In the General Alarm case, holding
that uncertificated competition by Underdown could not be enjoined by appellant certi-
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of a certificate of public convenience and necessity has been found appropriate
with respect to conventional public utilities.88 On the other hand, such a certificate could not be required for entry into the business of leasing motor vehicles without drivers, in the absence of substantial competition with common
carriers, because there were no appropriate interests.8 9 The same principle controlled, although the facts were closer to the border-line, in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann,90 where the Supreme Court held that the business of manufacturing ice for sale and distribution could not be declared a public utility business soas to prevent Liebmann from engaging in that business unless he
proved that the previously certificated facilities of New State Ice Company
were insufficient and himself secured a certificate of public convenience and
necessity. 91
ficate holder, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that "The . . . interest must be of such
a nature that competition might lead to abuses detrimental to the public interest. The
public interest contemplated depends on the nature of the business, the means by which
it touches the public, and the abuses which may reasonably be anticipated if not controlled." Supra at 238-39, 262 P.2d at 672-73.
88. Relief Elec., Light, Heat and Power Co.'s Petition, supra note 87.
89. Hertz Drivurself v. Siggins, supra note 76.
90. Supra note 87.
91. The Oklahoma statute makes entry into the business of manufacturing ice
for sale and distribution dependent, in effect, upon a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Such a certificate was unknown to the common law. It is
a creature of the machine age, in which plants have displaced tools, and businesses
are substituted for trades. The purpose of requiring it is to promote the public
interest by preventing waste. Particularly in those businesses in which interest
and depreciation charges on plant constitute a large element in the cost of production, experience has taught that the financial burdens incident to unnecessary
duplication of facilities are likely to bring high rates and poor service ...
The certificate was required first for railroads; then for street railways; then
for other public utilities whose operation is dependent upon the grant of some
special privilege. The requirement has been widely extended to common carriers
by motor vehicle .... As applied to public utilities, the validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of the requirement of the certificate has never been successfully questioned.
Id. at 281-82.
Note that in Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 189 Cal. 573, 580, 209 Pac. 586,
589 (1922) (affirming an order that Motor Transit Co. cease furnishing uncertificated
local bus service between Anaheim and Santa Anna in competition with certificated service), the requirement of a certificate was justified as follows:
The certificate of public convenience and necessity is the means whereby protection is given to the utility rendering adequate service at a reasonable rate against
ruinous competition. The person ...

obtaining a certificate must operate ...

fur-

nishing uniform and efficient service to the public. If anyone else would be at
liberty to operate without such a certificate he might operate at his own pleasure
and only under favorable conditions, thus making it impossible for the holder of
a certificate to successfully carry on his business. It is the public interest in
efficient service which is being safe-guarded by the requirement of a certificate.
Robinson, op. cit. supra note 50, at 27, explains as "compensation" for the duties (duties
to serve the public and to serve at reasonable rates) the requirement of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity: "This making a population tributary to the utility is the
latter's compensation for the duties; enforcement of the duties safeguards the population
from the rapacities of monopoly while they enjoy its efficiencies and economies." See
GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN CAPITALIsM 215 (1957).
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The key to public utility regulations' constitutional limitations may thus
be found in the foregoing three lines of cases relating respectively to the reasonableness of (1) an affirmative duty to serve the public, (2) the duty and
right to charge reasonable rates, and (3) certificates of public convenience
and necessity. These three elements in combination constitute a sufficient distinguishing characteristic of the type of regulation deemed appropriate by
state legislatures for the classes of business that we currently call public utilities. Constitutions, statutes and cases thus combine to define, without finality
in so vital an area where the law must -be stable but cannot stand still, the
public utility concept with which the public, the bar and the bench must now
work.

